Between 1999 and 2005, Japan experienced
deflation (International Monetaray
Fund, 2003, 2008). That is, on average,
prices fell. Between 1985 and 1994,
Japan experienced an average inflation
rate of 1.4 percent, a relatively low inflation
rate by world standards. A slowing
economy brought the inflation rate down
to negative territory in 1995. It rebounded
and climbed to the 2 percent range in
1997, before falling again, sinking into
negative territory by 1999. The inflation
rate of consumer prices stood at zero in
2007. The inflation rate of consumer
prices edged into positive territory in
2008.
The economic deceleration that
marked the beginnings of deflation
began when an asset bubble burst. In
1986, the Nikkei Index of the Tokyo
stock market stood in the 12,000 range
(www.finance.yahoo.com). The market
took off, reaching the dizzy height of
roughly 39,000 in 1989. Then the market
began unwinding, sinking to the 15,000
range in 1992. The market never
recovered its previous high. In October
2008, the Tokyo stock market sank to
6994.9.
In monetary systems managed by
modern central banks, unwanted and
uncontrolled deflation poses a puzzle in
the eyes of many observers. In the past,
central banks were limited in the
amount of paper money they could issue
by a gold standard. Today, central banks
can issue as much money as is consistent
with stable prices. If a country is
caught in a deflationary spiral, the
central bank is free to augment domestic
circulating money stocks until prices
stop falling. The concept that printing
more money leads to inflation is standard
economic doctrine.
The trend toward deflation marked
the end of a spectacular phase of economic
development in Japan. Between
1960 and 1973, economic growth in
Japan averaged 9.8 percent annually,
over twice the rate of most developed
countries. Between 1973 and 1980,
economic growth in Japan slipped to
3.9 percent, still a relatively high growth
rate for that period. The United States averaged 2.1 percent growth for the
same period. Nearly all countries experienced
a substantial deceleration of
growth for that time frame. Between
1980 and 1988, growth converged
closer to the average of other developed
countries, averaging annual growth of
3.6 percent. The United States averaged
growth of 3.3 percent for this same
period. These comparisons are based on
data in Summers and Heston (1991). In
the 1990s, Japan went from above average
growth to below average growth,
averaging less than 1 percent between
1992 and 2002 (Bank for International
Settlements, 2005).
In Japan, the overnight interest rate is
the main index of monetary policy,
comparable to the federal funds interest
rate in the United States. Monetary laxness
shows up as lower interest rates. To
arrest the deflation and stimulate
economic growth, the Bank of Japan
dropped the overnight interest rate. In
1995, the Bank of Japan changed the rate
from over 8 percent to less than 0.5 percent
(International Monetary Fund, 2003).
The easy money policy failed to stem the
tide of deflation. As inflation slipped into
the negative column, the Bank of Japan
pushed the overnight interest rate to
ranges measured in one thousandths of a
percentage point. For 1999, the International
Monetary Fund reports an average
overnight interest rate of zero. The average
rose to 0.2 percent for 2000, and then
sank back to zero for the years 2001
through 2005. The International Monetary
Fund reports an average rate of 0.2
percent for 2006. In February 2007, the
average rate stood at 0.5 percent.
The development of deflationary
expectations became a major complicating
factor. Expectations of inflation persuade
consumers and businesses to borrow
money and buy goods before prices go up.
Inflation encourages buying goods and
capital equipment sooner rather than later.
Expected deflation has the opposite effect.
Consumers and businesses are hesitant to
buy goods and equipment with borrowed
money if the goods and equipment are
selling for prices higher than what they
will sell for in the future. With expected
deflation, businesses require a higher
expected rate of return before borrowing
funds to purchase capital equipment.
Many economists believe Japan in the
1990s entered into a liquidity trap. In a
liquidity trap, money is in high demand
because of the expectation that all other
assets can be purchased on more favorable
terms in the future. The strong
demand for money as a financial asset
frustrates efforts to increase spending by
increasing the money supply.