The liquidity of an asset refers to the
ease and quickness with which it can be
converted into money or other goods and
services. An asset that can be quickly
sold for money at low cost is a liquid
asset. Money is the most liquid of all
financial assets since it can be quickly
exchanged for goods and services. Liquidity
crises usually indicate difficulty in
converting nonmonetary assets, particularly
financial assets, into cash either by
selling the assets or by using them as
collateral.
Individual firms are said to face a liquidity
crisis when they cannot obtain
short-term financing. A retailer who cannot
obtain short-term loans to purchase
inventories or obtain goods on credit
from suppliers is said to suffer a liquidity
crisis. A liquidity crisis for a particular
firm indicates that creditors worry
about the firm’s ability to pay. The failure
of an anticipated loan to come
through or sudden and unexpected onetime
expenditures can leave a firm with a
liquidity crisis. For an individual firm, a
liquidity crisis may be virtually synonymous
with a credit crunch.
The more serious liquidity crises can
put an entire financial sector under
severe pressure, can have wide macroeconomic
dimensions, and usually
requires government or central bank
action to resolve. In the course of business,
financial institutions accept claims
against themselves that are liquid. In the
case of banks, depositors can withdraw
their money any time. The claims that
financial institutions accept against
themselves are offset by claims that
financial institutions accept against others.
Financial institutions cannot demand
payment on these claims against others
as quickly. A bank must redeem a bank
deposit on demand but it cannot demand
early repayment of loans. A wave of
depositors withdrawing money from a
financial institution can force that institution
into a liquidity crisis even if all its
outstanding loans are sound and have an
excellent chance of repayment.
In the late 1980s, thrift institutions in
Texas went through a severe liquidity
crisis that virtually wiped out the savings
and loan (S&L) industry. The S&L institutions
first encountered difficulty with
troubled loan portfolios. The crash in oil
prices plunged the Texas real estate market
into a deep slump, substantially
reducing the value of collateral that
S&Ls held against loans. A string of
well-publicized failures of Texas S & Ls caused worried depositors to start
pulling their money out.
There was never
a run on these institutions, probably
because S&L deposits had deposit insurance.
It was a slow, steady withdrawal.
Pension funds and other large customers
began pulling money out. Texas S&Ls
began accepting deposits put together by
brokers at interest rates well above the
rates paid by thrifts in other states. Regulators
tried to broker funds from
stronger thrifts to weaker ones, but the
effort was not sufficient. The large number
of failures in Texas and elsewhere
bankrupted the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation that insured
deposits at S & Ls. Congress enacted a
multimillion dollar bailout to meet the
claims of deposit insurance.
In 2008, the United States experienced
a liquidity crisis that threatened to
bring down an entire financial system.
Financial institutions were holding
mortage-backed securities, including
securities backed by mortgages extended
to borrowers with credit problems.
Financial institutions purchased these
mortgages by borrowing short term in
credit markets. When the default rate on
these mortgages rose above expected
levels, the market value of these securities
plummeted. Financial institutions
were left unable to borrow short term
and unable to sell mortgage-backed
securities for cash. As an emergency
measure, the U.S. central bank, The Federal
Reserve System, began granting
loans based on other kinds of collateral
than government bonds.